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NOTES
FORECLOSURE BY POWER OF SALE IN DEEDS OF TRUST
IN MISSOURI *
An oft-heard phrase, "sold at the east door of the courthouse,"
is descriptive of the final event in a security transaction which
began with the execution of a deed of trust; an event that is part
of the definition of the word foreclosure. It is the purpose of this
writing to examine one method by which foreclosure is accom-
plish-the exercise of the power of sale contained in a deed
of trust.
The method of forclosure with which we are most familiar is
the petition in a court of equity for an order of foreclosure, for
it was in connection with the development of this equitable
process that much of the struggle between the law and equity
courts was fought.,
The use of a power of sale as a means of foreclosure without
the aid of an equity decree is of comparatively recent develop-
ment, and one which is not universally accepted. 2 In Missouri,
however, it is a frequently used device, governed by statute.3
The statute describes the power as an "option," to be exercised
by the "holder of the debt," through a "trustee's sale.' 4 The
power is not found exclusively in the trust deed form, however,
for the statute says" . . . in the same manner and in all respects
as in the case of mortgages with power of sale. . . ."5 That the
use of the trust deed form of the power is well established in
Missouri is seen in the comment of a dissenting judge in an early
action of ejectment in the case of Carson v. Blakey:6
Deeds of trust have so commonly obtained in this country as
to enable the creditor, who is desirous of avoiding the delays
of procuring a foreclosure, to attain all the ends of security
without a resort to court."
That it is a method of foreclosure separate from the judicial
sale, and of equal validity, is established by the decision in
* This paper was written as part of the requirements for the course in
Mortgages.
1. WALSH, EQuiry 122-124 (1930).
2. I GLENN, MORTGAGES §98 (1943).
3. Mo. REV. STAT. §3450 (1939).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. 6 Mo. 273 (1840). (The judge dissented from a majority opinion which
allowed the creditor to be named as trustee for the deed of trust).
7. Id. at 276.
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Homa .et al. v. Connett, which held that mortgages which could
be foreclosed by power of sale did not require a foreclosure by
court proceeding. This could only follow from the fact that a
trustee's sale operates as a complete foreclosure, as though all
the parties were before the court.,
Although referred to in the statute as an option, it is incorrect
to assume that is is an option which can be exercised indepen-
dently of an agreement between the mortgagor (grantor of the
trust deed) and the mortgagee (beneficiary of the trust deed).
This statutory power of sale is a matter of contract between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. In the case of Adams v. Boydz,1" the
court described it in this manner:
The power to sell under a deed of trust is a matter of con-
tract between the parties on the conditions expressed in the
instrument, and does not exist independent of it."
The Adams case further emphasizes the contractual quality of
this power in its holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor
applies to foreclosure sales under the power of sale contained in
a deed of trust; that the purchaser takes with notice that all of
the conditions in the deed of trust upon which the trustee's
power to act depends, are complied with. Referring to the statute
alone to determine the necessity of expressing the power in the
trust deed, we find no mandatory clause, but such an expression
is suggested by frequent reference to "power of sale given in any
mortgage or deed of trust."12 The power of sale in a deed of
trust is, then, an optional, statutory method of forclosing the
mortgagor's equity of redemption without the delay and for-
mality of an equity decree.
II
Having chosen the deed of trust as the desired security instru-
ment, and having expressed therein a power of sale in a chosen
trustee,13 agreed upon by mortgagor and mortgagee, the next
8. 348 Mo. 244, 152 S.W.2d 1053 (1941).
9. Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W.2d 57 (1938).
10. 332 Mo. 484, 58 S.W.2d 704 (1933). (An action of ejectment in which
the plaintiffs claimed under an administrator's deed. The court held in
favor of the defendants who claimed under a sheriff's deed of later date).
11. Id. at 490, 58 S.W.2d at 707.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. §§3481, 3450 and 3463 (1939).
13. This is a substantial difference between a mortgage and deed of trust.
The power of sale is the desirable feature in the deed of trust instrument.
I GLENN, MORTGAGES §20 (1943).
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question is what procedure is involved in the exercise of this
power?
The answer lies in the statutes.1 4 The first question is where
will the sale take place? The statute provides that is shall be
made in the county where the land, the subject of the sale, is
located,15 For the mortgagee whose deed of trust covers two
pieces of property in two different counties, such a provision pre-
sents a problem, which is answered in the case of Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Coleman." The court held a sale of both
pieces of property at one time in one of the counties to be void
as to the property not in the county in which the sale was heldY17
It is clear from this rule that the trustee would be obliged to
hold two sales in two counties to meet the statutory requirement.
Of perhaps less substantial value,1"and yet a practical problem
which has given the courts considerable trouble, is the question
of where in the county the sale is to be held. It is actually a
matter of contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee, and
such contract may specify any place agreed upon. 9 Such a
simple proposition would not be worth a moment's notice were
it not for the fact that frequently the problems arising from
these contracts make the application of the rule difficult. As an
illustration of this last statement, the case of Stewart v. Brown"o
stands in interesting contrast with that of Davis v. Hess.21
In the Brown case, which was an action to redeem, the deed
called for a sale at the east door of the court house. One year
prior to the sale, the court house was partially destroyed. At the
date of the sale, the various courts and county officials were
located in different buildings throughout the town. The trustee
gave notice that he would sell the property at the "front door of
the court house." 2- The sale was held at the north door of the
building in which the circuit court met. The court found that
14. Mo. REV. STAT. §§3463 and 3464 (1939).
15. Id. §3463.
16. 99 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. App. 1936). (An action for balance of debt due
after foreclosure of one tract of land, and to have equity of redemption in
second tract of land closed.)
17. Because the statute does not specify the exact location in the county
in which the sale is to be held.
18. Stewart et al. v. Brown et aL, 16 S.W. 389 (Mo. 1891).
19. Ibid.
20. 103 M. 31, 15 S.W. 324 (1891).
21. Stewart et al. v. Brown et al., 16 S.W. 389 (Mo. 1891).
22. 103 Mo. 31, 32, 15 S.W. 324, 325 (1891).
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many, who otherwise would have, did not attend the sale, fearing
its illegality. There was also a finding that the property was sold
for one-half its value. Judge Black, speaking for the court, held
that the terms of the contract governed the sale, and there could
be no deviation therefrom in the face of the exact language used;
that even if the court were to give more weight to the use of the
words "court house" than to the designated door, the sale could
not be sustained. In the court's opinion, the only building in the
town which could qualify as a court house (in the sense used in
such counties-that it is a building in which the county affairs
are conducted) was the partially destroyed court house building.
In the Davis case the same judge heard a cause of action in
ejectment, brought by the purchaser at the sale, against the
mortgagor who was still in possession. The trust deed specified
a sale at the "court house door." At the time the deed was exe-
cuted, there was no county court house. The old one had been
torn down. The courts and county officials were meeting in
various buildings throughout the town. At the time of the sale,
the new court house building was being erected, and only the
outside was completed. The sale was held at the door of this
empty building. This time Judge Black said the sale was made
in compliance with the terms of the contract in the trust deed,
considering the surrounding circumstances; that since the courts
and county officials were scattered throughout the town, the only
building which could be considered the court house was the one
under construction. He went on to point out that there was no
evidence that anyone was misled as to the place of sale, and there
was good attendance.
The two cases were tried in the same year (1891) and are ex-
cellent examples of the microscopic examination to which the
courts subject such sales. Despite the distinction between the
cases as regards the language in the deeds of trust, and the fact
that the court found that no one was misled in the Davis case,
while many shunned the trustee's sale in the Brown case, the
latter decision seems a harsh one. The court seems to have made
a broad presumption that the price received for the land sold in
the Brown case, which equalled only one-half its value, was a
direct result of some of the townspeople staying away. There is
nothing in the report of the case to show that any of these people
were expressly interested in this land and would have paid more.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/6
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It also appears to be a harsh decision when one considers that in
neither of the cases was the sale made at a building that met the
court's own description of a county court house, i.e., a building
in which the county affairs were being conducted. There were
no county affairs being conducted in a building completed only
on the outside in the Davis case, and only the circuit court was
meeting in the place of sale in the Brown case. Yet the court ac-
cepted the uncompleted building, where no business was con-
ducted as being within such definition in the Davis case, and did
so on the ground that the attendance was good. This seems to
make compliance with the terms of the deed of trust turn upon
the conduct of persons who are not parties thereto. These cases
should serve as a warning to draftsmen, however, to consider the
possibility of such contingencies arising after the execution of
the deed, and to strive to describe the place of sale, as well as
alternative places, to eliminate such controversies.
The same section of the statute23 also provides that not less
than twenty days notice of the intended sale must be given, re-
gardless of the provisions in the mortgage or deed of trust. This
section is susceptible of an interpretation which would lead the
uninformed to publish one advertisement of the sale within
twenty days of the sale date. There is, however, greater clarity
in the succeeding section 24 of the statute which provides in part:
Notice of sale ... shall be given by advertisement inserted
for at least twenty times, and continued to the day of sale,
in some daily newspaper .... 25
The court in Hoffman v. Bigh4M,26 confronted with such an
interpretation, said that when the two sections were construed
together, the statute clearly intended that publication on each of
the twenty consecutive days next preceding the sale be a mini-
mum requirement. In considering the use of the word "to," in
the phrase, "to the day of sale," the court interpreted it to be a
word of exclusion by common usage, which must mean "until or
up to." Thus, advertisement on the day of the sale could not be
treated as advertisement on the twentieth day, so that if there
had been advertisement on only nineteen preceding days, the
statute would not have been complied with.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. §3463 (1939).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. §3464 (1939)
25. Ibid.
26. Hoffman v. Bigham, 324 Mo. 516, 24 S.W.2d 125 (1930).
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Time, however, is not only part of this statute which has re-
quired judicial interpretation. Even the word "newspaper" has
been the subject of litigation. In the case of Judahb v. Pitts2l the
court accepted, as complying with the statute, a publication,
printed daily except Sunday, devoted to court business, real
estate and financial news, which included foreclosure sales. Had
the foregoing been a publication in a county in which there were
no cities of 40,000 population, the sale could have been advertised
in four successive issues, with the last insertion not more than
one week prior to the day of the sale.28
One cannot examine the courts' views on the procedure which
constitutes compliance with these statutes without becoming
somewhat doubtful .that the exercise of this power is an act of
foreclosure which is looked on by courts with favor. That such
observation is not a wholly imaginative experience can best be
illustrated by the language of the court in the case of Stoffel et
al. v. Schroeder et aZ.:29
It has always been the doctrine of this court as well as of
courts elsewhere that the mode of sale referred to, being a
harsh method of disposing of the equity of redemption,
should be watched with jealous solicitude, and overthrown,
if not conducted in all fairness and integrity.. 30
This is an expression of the philosophy which permeates the
decisions of the courts whose opinions will be considered as
further examination is made to include the foreclosure procedure
in the exercise of the powers of that all-important party to the
sale, the trustee.
III.
In the Adams case, supra, it was observed that the trustee's
power is a contractual one. It is not, however, a power which the
trustee exercises as holder of the legal title to the mortgaged
property. On the contrary, as said in the case of Lustenberger v.
Sarkesian,1- the legal title does not vest in the trustee immedi-
ately upon the execution of the deed of trust. In Missouri, a
mortgage is but a security for the payment of the debt owed, and
27. 333 Mo. 301, 62 S.W.2d 715 (1933).
28. Mo. RBv. STAT. §3464 (1939).
29. 62 Mo. 147 (1876).
30. Id. at 149.31. 343 Mo. 51, 119 S.W.2d 921 (1938). (Suit to set aside a sale under




until the mortgagee enters for breach of condition or until final
foreclosure, the mortgagor is the owner of the property.32 Nor
is the trustee's power to sell to be implied from any relationship
with the mortgagee (such as an agency relationship with regard
to collection of interest on the notes for which the trust deed is
security) .33 So long as the trust deed states as a condition pre-
cedent, that the sale shall be ordered by the beneficiary, or holder
of the note and trust deed, exercise of the power of sale by a
trustee upon default without such permission or direction is in-
valid.34 On the other hand, where no such condition precedent
exists, the default alone is sufficient to authorize the trustee to
proceed with the sale3 The case of Petering v. Kuhsr is an
example of just such an exercise of the trustee's power. In that
case the mortgagor was given extensions of time on the indebted-
ness, but the trustee had exercised the power of sale and stated
in his deed that both principal and interest had been due on the
notes at the time of foreclosure. The court established the posi-
tion of the trustee as one of agency. To define the trustee-agent's
powers, the court drew upon the decision in Butler Building and
Investment Co. v. Dinsworth, where the rule was announced,
that the trustee is the agent for the grantor of the deed of trust
and the holder, as to the third parties; that any statement, by
such agent, of default, binds his two principals even though they
have not requested foreclosure.
In addition to the case discussed above, which give a binding
effect to the statements of default made by the trustee during the
foreclosure procedure, there is also a statutory effect given to the
trustee's recitals of default. Such recitals in the trustee's deed to
the purchaser are accepted in all courts as prima facie evidence
of the truth of such statements. 8 If rebutted, however, the trus-
tee would be in a position of breach; and although the Adams
case, supra, imposed the doctrine of caveat emptor upon all such
sales, the court in Hayes v. D:elzell," said that that doctrine does
32. Reynolds v. Stepanek, 339 Mo. 804, 99 S.W.2d 65 (1936).
33. St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Walter, 329. Mo. 715, 46
S.W.2d 166 (1931). (Where the trustee exercised power of sale without
knowledge of the mortgagee.)
34. Lustenberger v. Sarkesian, 343 Mo. 51, 169 S.W.2d 921 (1938).
35. Petering v. Kuhs, 350 Mo. 1197, 171 S.W.2d 635 (1943).
36. Ibid.
37. 146 Mo. 361, 48 S.W. 449 (1898).
38. Mo. REv. STAT. §3481 (1939).
39. 21 Mo. App. 679 (1886).
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not preclude the right to maintain an action for damages where
the trustee's advertisement of sale is based upon fraud or deceit.
In dictum, that same court said that the beneficiary of the trust
deed would be liable if he had knowledge of the trustee's acts. 40
The Petering case, supra, is also authority for the rule that
where there is no default the foreclosure sale is void. In that
decision, the court adds an important consideration in judging
the act of the trustee, which is,, that although there may be no
default as to principal or interest because of an extension of the
mortgage deed, there may yet be a default by reason of non-
performance of one of the covenants in the deed of trust, such
as the covenant to pay taxes.
Thus is seen the nature of the power of sale which may be
exercised by the trustee of a deed of trust. As a means of de-
scribing this power more fully, it is well to contrast it with that
of a mortgagee in a mortgage which expresses a power of sale.
In Pickett v. Jones, 41 this power of mortgage is described as one
which is appended to the estate conveyed; one that is coupled
with an interest, 2 and is irrevocable; one that is assignable by a
conveyance of all the interest in the debt and the estate securing
the debt. In contrast with this, the same court says that a trus-
tee's duties under a deed of trust are non-delegable; that to allow
any assignment thereof would be equivalent to allowing a mort-
gagee to transfer his power of sale in a mortgage, without trans-
ferring the debt, because in a trust deed, the beneficiary is the
holder of the debt, while the trustee holds the power of sale.
So in addition to being contractual in nature, the power in-
cludes a non-delegable duty. In the case law regarding this
quality of the trustee's power, the language of the Stoffel case,
supra, appears again urging close scrutiny of the trustee's
actions. An example of this is found in the case of Graham v.
King,- in which the court imposed the duty upon the trustee
to exercise fair and just discretion; to supervise the sale per-
sonally, and be ready to adjourn the same if it appeared that the
property was about to be sacrificed; and emphasized the fact
40. Id. at 682.
41. 63 Mo. 195 (1876).
42. But see I GLENN, MouTGAGE S §§99, 614 (1943). (Where the author
rejects this theory as unnecessary, saying that the power of sale is a part
of the mortgagee's security.)
43. 50 Mo. 22 (1872).
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that such a duty was a personal one which could not be assigned
to third persons. One attempt to delegate these duties, where
there was no express power to do so in the trust deed, is found
in Polliham v. Reveley.44 To clarify the position of the trustee in
such circumstances, the court borrowed the following language
from the case of Goode v. Comfort:
Trustees are considered as the agents of both parties, debtor
and creditor, and their actions in performing the duties of
their trust should be conducted with the strictest impartial-
ity and integrity ...justice will exact of them the most
scrupulous fidelity.4 5
This non-delegable quality is also detected in those cases deal-
ing with a deed of trust in which provisions have been made for
a particular successor to the named trustees. Such a provision
is put into the trust deed for the obvious reasons that the trustee
may die, be absent, or refuse to perform his duties. It is a com-
mon procedure to specify the sheriff of the county as the trustee's
successor. Such a provision illustrates the point under discus-
sion. In the case of Lunsford v. Davis,46 the trust deed desig-
nated the sheriff as the trustee's successor. Prior to the fore-
closure sale, the named trustee was removed, and a substitute
appointed by the beneficiary. The court held that the appoint-
ment of a substitute was an improper delegation of the duties of
the named successor, the sheriff. A more complicated situation
existed in the case of McNutt v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
Co.47 There the trust deed named the trustee, and named the
successor in case of death, etc. It further provided that in the
event of any of the named contingenies happenings to the named
trustee and successor, the "then" sheriff of the county was to act
as trustee. The default occurred while the trustee and successor
were out of state, but the beneficiary of the trust deed granted
a five year extension, and there was no immediate sale of the
property. Later, while the named trustee and successor were
still absent, and a successor sheriff was in office, the sale was
requested and made. The court held the sale invalid, saying that
44. 181 Mo. 622, 635, 81 S.W. 182, 185 (1904). (Where the deed pro-
vided that the named trustee could act in person or by attorney in fact.
Held this was not a power which could be delegated even though the trust
anticipated the possible need of an attorney to assist in carrying out the
duties of a trustee).
45. 39 Mo. 313, 325 (1866).
46. 300 Mo. 508, 254 S.W. 878 (1923).
47. 181 Mo. 94, 79 S.W. 703 (1903).
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a trust deed could be drawn so that any sheriff might properly
make the sale; but where,'as in this case, the deed stipulated the
"'then" sheriff, and the "then" sheriff was in office at the time of
default, his successor's sale was unauthorized. Such a decision
is a good illustration of how firmly the philosophy of the Stoffel
case has become implanted in Missouri decision on this subject.
It is true that cases subsequent to the McNutt case, supra,
applied a more salutary rule to this problem. They interpreted
the "then" sheriff to mean the sheriff in office when the fore-
closure is desired.4 But in the case of Swabey v. Boyers,4 which
made just such an interpretation, the court went further to say
that such a sheriff (the one in office when the foreclosure is de-
sired) becomes vested with an irrevocable interest which he
retains even after the death of the grantor. So again, however
complicated or devious the path from the execution of the trust
deed to the moment of the foreclosure sale, the courts will seek
out the trustee named in the instrument, and scrutinize the sale
for total compliance with the rules just discussed.
Nor does the courts' scrutiny end with the compliance with
the above rules. Refering again to the statute,50 attention is
directed to the fact that the sale is one which is to be made by
the trustee, which leads to the next step in our inquiry -the
manner in which the sale is conducted. The Petering case, supra,
is authority for the rule that the trustee need not actually cry
the sale himself, but must give it his personal supervision so as
to best protect the interest of the parties. Where, however, the
trustee undertakes to cry the sale, he will be held accountable for
the manner in which he exercises his power. Illustrative of this
point is the case of West v. Axtell, where the sheriff, as sub-
stituted trustee, cried the sale after announcing that there would
be no more sales, and the crowd had dispersed. He was unaware
that there was an additional sale scheduled. After learning this,
he conducted the sale rather than postponing it until a time when
all interested parties could be present. Of such conduct, the court
said:
When the trustee exercises the power of sale ... it may be
that he is not conscious of an intention to act unfairly, yet
48. Swobey v. Boyers, 274 Mo. 332, 203 S.W. 204 (1918).
49. Ibid.
50. Mo. Rv. STAT. §3450 (1939)."
51. West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1928).
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if his conduct was actually unfair, and operated to the
injury of the complaining party to the transaction, such
conduct, though unintentional, will not relieve the sale from
its taint, nor the unfair act of its consequences.
52
The same language with regard to the unintentional conduct
of the trustee is found in the case of Stone et al. v. Hammons.53
There the trustee announced at the sale that the land was being
sold subject to a lease. The lease actually existed, but had been
made subsequently to the execution of the deed of trust, so the
deed would not be subject thereto. The announcement scared
off the purchasers, and the holder of the lease was able to pur-
chase a $4,000 piece of property for $2,800. The court considered
the trustee's act to be a chilling of the bid, and a proper basis
for setting the sale aside. It is important to notice that the court
in this case did not base its decision on the low price at which
the lessee was able to bid in the property; it was the chilling of
the bid, however, unintentional, which tainted the sale. A court
looks for more than a low purchase price as a basis for setting
aside a sale. As said in Judah v. Pitts, inadequacy of price alone
is not sufficient. "The inadequacy must shock the moral sense
,," and there must be some unfair dealing or fraud.
IV.
Up to this point the examination of the power of sale has been
confined to the statutory requirements and the procedure neces-
sary to comply therewith. Among the cases cited there have
been numerous holdings to the effect that many such sales failed
to comply with these requirements. Just what the result of such
sales might be is found in the next cases to be considered.
Reference has already been made to the results of a fore-
closure by exercise of the power of sale; that it operates as a
complete foreclosure as though all the parties were before the
court, as stated in the Green case, supra. If this is true, then the
result of such sale must be a conveyance of valid title. That such
is the result of the sale is shown in the case of Wharton v. Farm-
ers Bank,- where the court said:
In Missouri foreclosure under power of sale contained in a
52. Id. at 415, 17 S.W.2d at 334.
53. 347 Mo. 129, 146 S.W.2d 606 (1941).
54. 333 Mo. 301, 313, 62 S.W.2d 715, 721 (1933).
55. 119 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1941).
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deed of trust is at effectual to pass title as a foreclosure by
action. 6
In the Graham case, supra, where the sale was made by a
party to whom the duties of the trustee were improperly dele-
gated, and where there was no default, and the trustee was not
present at the sale as in the Petering case, supra, the sales were
said to be void. Where, however, the failure of the trustee can
be construed as irregular, the rule of the case of Adam V. Car-
penter," will be followed. It is the rule that a sale which is at
most irregular can only be taken advantage of by the mortgagor
or those claiming under him, by an action to redeem, accom-
panied by an offer to pay the debt. This rule was reiterated by
a later court in the case of Wakefield v. Dingerf where a mort-
gagor was seeking to eject the mortgagee, who had taken peace-
ful possession under a foreclosure sale, on the ground that the
sale was void for several irregularities which included sale at
wrong door of court house, no default when sale made, and deed
of trust not filed until after the suit was brought. In denying
the mortgagor the right of ejectment, the court said the conten-
tion that the sale was void due to these irregularities was not
supported by any decision in the State of Missouri, and was
contrary to the rule of the Adams case.
Later decisions would indicate that although the Wakefield
case applied the rule of the Adams case properly, it went too far
in including a sale without default as an irregularity. 9 The rule
is stated again under somewhat different circumstances in
Abrams v. Lakewood Park Cemetery Association.60 In that case
it was urged that the foreclosure by sale of property dedicated
to use as a cemetery was void unless the sale was ordered by a
court of equity where the cemetery rights could best be pro-
tected. The court held that where there is a "legitimate attempt"
to exercise the power of sale in a deed of trust, and the mort-
gagee has a clear right to foreclose, the sale is not void, but is
at most voidable, subject to a dissaffirmance in an appropriate
action of redemption by the mortgagor.
56. Id. at 490.
57. 187 Mo. 613, 86 S.W. 445 (1905). (Action to set aside a deed of trust
and have it declared a lien on the still-existing debt.)
58. 234 Mo. App. 407, 135 S.W.2d 17 (1939).
59. See Petering v. Kuhs, 350 Mo. 1197, 171 S.W.2d 635 (1943).
60. 355 Mo. 313, 196 S.W.2d 278 (1946).
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There is a final consideration in the trustee's exercise of the
power sale. Although there is no impropriety in the mortgagee's
(beneficiary) bidding in the property at the foreclosure sale61
(in fact it is contemplated in the statute governing the sale),62
it is an established rule that such a purchase, either directly or
indirectly, by the trustee, is a breach of his fiduciary duty; and
his purchase is subject to redemption by the grantor (mort-
gagor) *63 In the case of Jodd v. Lee,64 such a rule was enunci-
ated; but in examining the facts, the court was satisfied that the
purchaser had not bid in the property for the trustee at the time,
and allowed that trustee's purchase of the property, some four
years later, to stand as valid purchase.
Where there is a direct or indirect purchase for or by the
trustee, the transaction is said to be void. For example, there is
the statement of the court in the case of Northcutt v. Fine65 :
Neither can a trustee directly or indirectly become the pur-
chaser at his own foreclosure sale. Such sale will be null and
void."6
It is well to point out that the above quotation appeared in the
opinion of a court that was hearing a petition in equity to set
aside a trustee's deed in an action to redeem the mortgaged prop-
erty. It is in such an action only that the invalidity of the
trustee's sale can be attacked. The presumption of fraud which
accompanies the trustee's direct or indirect purchase at the fore-
closure is a basis for attacking the validity of the sale, but such
an attack must be direct, and come in an action to redeem. It
can never be a collateral attack; for example, it cannot be raised
as a defense in an action of law for a recovery by the mortgagee
of the balance due on the debt.67
When the foreclosure sale has reached the point where the
mortgagor's right to redeem is being asserted in a court of
equity, this examination of the transaction is completed. The
right to redeem is statutory; it does not exist as a matter of
course.68 It is a right which must be asserted in careful com-
61. Bruner v. Stevenson, 73 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. App. 1934).
62. Mo. REv. STAT. §3450 (1939).
63. Jodd v. Lee, 256 Mo. 536, 165 S.W. 991 (1913).
64. Ibid.
65. 44 S.W. 2d 125 (Mo. 1931).
66. Id. at 128.
67. Gempp v. Teiber, 172 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. App. 1943).
68. Judab v. Pitts, 333 Mo. 301, 62 S.W.2d 715 (1933).
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pliance with the statute.69 To pursue the factors of compliance,
and the concomitant rights arising therefrom, leads beyond the
scope of this writing. Its observations have been confined to the
transactions at the east door of the court house, across which
falls the ever-present shadow of the words of the Stoff e case:
... a harsh method of disposing of the equity of redemption
[which] should be watched with jealous solicitude... .70
ALLEN CHURCHILLt
69. M o. REV. STAT. §3450 (1939).
70. Stoffel v. Schroeder, 62 Mo. 147, 148 (1876).
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